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Prior Beliefs and Voter Turnout in the 1986 and 1988 
Congressional Elections
Stephen P. Nicholson, University of California, Davis
Ross A. Miller, Santa Clara University
The costs of political information differ between and among elections. In 
those elections where information costs are high, voters should rely on infor-
mation from previous elections. Although research on voter choice has long 
recognized that voters use past information in their assessments of candi-
dates, studies of voter turnout are solely concerned with information avail-
able in the current election. Specifically, the closeness of elections is a cen-
tral concern in rational actor models of voter turnout. As such, these studies 
neglect the effects of prior electoral competitiveness on citizens’ decisions to 
vote. In this study we propose that actors rely on prior beliefs when deciding 
to vote in information-poor elections. Controlling for information available 
in the current election, we explore this possibility in the 1986 and 1988 House 
elections and find that prior beliefs have a significant effect on turnout.
The closeness of elections is central to rational actor approaches to voter 
turnout. In the dominant rational choice approach, the calculus of voting 
(Riker and Ordeshook 1968), citizens base their decisions to vote, in part, 
on the probability that their vote will affect the electoral outcome. Howev-
er, scholars have implicitly assumed that the amount of information avail-
able to voters in assessing the closeness of elections is equivalent across 
and among elections. This assumption is problematic since the amount of 
information available in an election varies with office and the profile of the 
contest. Aldrich (1993: 262) observes that “political scientists have studied 
turnout almost exclusively in high profile contests, in which case informa-
tion acquisition (if not processing) costs can safely be considered small.” 
In contrast to highly visible presidential candidates, those running for the
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House, especially challengers, are relatively unknown (Jacobson 1992; 
chapter 5; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Stokes and Miller 1962). The gen-
eral low visibility of House races, coupled with low challenger resources 
(Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson and Kemen 1983; Mann and Wolfinger 1980), 
makes these elections quite distinct from each other and from elections for 
higher office (e.g., president, governor).
Because most House elections are information-poor, it is unlikely that 
citizens primarily base their decisions to vote on the perceived closeness 
of a race. Of course, when available, the closeness of an election is criti-
cal new information. The decision to vote in House elections, however, 
should be recognized as a repeated choice in which citizens rely on pri-
or beliefs about the electoral competitiveness of the district in which they 
reside. Prior beliefs are formed from past experience and updated when 
new information is available. Absent new information, a congressional 
district that was hotly contested in the prior election should alert citizens 
that the incumbent is vulnerable in the current election. Likewise, a prior 
election in which the incumbent won by a large margin should inform cit-
izens that their vote will not be decisive to the outcome of the subsequent 
election. In short, because political information is a costly good, especially 
in information-poor environments, a district’s prior electoral history pro-
vides important contextual information, or prior beliefs, about the gener-
al competitiveness of elections.
In this article we develop and test a framework of prior beliefs. We ar-
gue that individuals form prior beliefs about electoral competitiveness and 
use this information when deciding to vote. Furthermore, this information 
is used even when citizens are knowledgeable about the current election. 
Voters form prior beliefs about closeness and update these beliefs when 
new information is acquired. We begin with a brief discussion of the the-
oretical and empirical issues surrounding rational actor theories of turn-
out, and then present our framework of prior beliefs. We then evaluate the 
effect of prior and updated beliefs on turnout in the 1986 and 1988 House 
elections, using a research design that specifies ex ante measures of a com-
petitive election. We do so in order to represent accurately the decision-
making environment actors face when updating their beliefs. Moreover, 
while most studies look at cross-sectional variation in levels of turnout, we 
examine tumout over time (see Grofman 1993).
RATIONAL ACTORS AND TURNOUT
In 1957, Downs published his expected utility theory of voting. In its 
original form, this theory posits that decisions to vote hinge on two fac-
tors: the probability that a single vote will affect the outcome of an election 
and the costs associated with voting. Because the probability that one vote 
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will significantly affect the outcome of an election is normally quite small 
(discounting the benefits of voting), Downs concludes that, for most elec-
tions, the costs will exceed the benefits. Therefore, according to Downs, 
most decisions to vote are irrational. In order to explain this seemingly ir-
rational act by many voters, Downs suggests that perhaps people vote be-
cause they wish to see democracy continue.
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) reformulated this approach in two ways. 
First, they expanded Downs’ argument that citizens vote because of their 
wish to see democracy continue by suggesting that people vote for a va-
riety of reasons, including civic duty, “allegiance to the political system,” 
“affirming a partisan preference,” “the satisfaction of deciding,” and effi-
cacy (1968: 28). Second, Riker and Ordeshook reformulated the probabil-
ity that a single vote will influence the outcome of an election as “a func-
tion of the estimated closeness of the vote” (1968: 32). These revisions of 
expected utility theory led Riker and Ordeshook to conclude that voting 
is a rational act (1968: 38).
While most of the empirical research at the aggregate level finds a weak 
to modest positive relationship between closeness and turnout (Barzel 
and Silberg 1973; Cox and Munger 1989; Crain, Leavens, and Abbot 1987; 
Gray 1976; Patterson and Caldeira 1983), individual-level analyses con-
clude that the relationship is weak at best, and possibly trivial (Ferejohn 
and Fiorina 1974; Foster 1984). Although Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) offer 
an alternative to the calculus of voting, the minimax regret criterion, Blais 
et al. (1995) found that it has no independent effect on turnout when test-
ed against components of the calculus of voting.
In response to the calculus of voting’s modest findings, scholars have 
used either implicitly or explicitly the strategic politicians’ framework 
of electoral behavior to address the relationship between closeness and 
turnout (Aldrich 1993; Jackman 1993). According to Jacobson and Kernell 
(1983), it is the reaction of strategic politicians to national conditions which 
explains House election outcomes. Although Jacobson and Kernell (1983) 
apply this framework to electoral outcomes, several studies have looked 
at strategic politicians, or explanations consistent with this approach and 
their effect on turnout. For example, Dawson and Zinser’s (1976) study 
of the 1972 congressional elections provides evidence that total expendi-
tures—a common indicator of elite activity—has a positive and signifi-
cant impact on turnout. Cox and Munger’s (1989) test of strategic politi-
cians and voter turnout in the 1982 congressional elections suggests that 
total candidate expenditures, controlling for the effects of closeness, has a 
strong effect on turnout. A strong relationship between elite behavior and 
turnout is also apparent in gubernatorial elections (Patterson and Caldei-
ra 1983). Thus, studies that posit a strategic politician’s argument general-
ly conclude that closeness matters, but its effects on turnout are of second-
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ary importance compared to the influence of elite activity.
In addition to the top-down influence of strategic politicians, we offer a 
framework of analysis that builds upon the calculus of voting. Specifical-
ly, we examine prior beliefs, in this instance knowledge of past elections, 
and how they affect voter perceptions of the closeness of current elections. 
We begin with a brief discussion of voter information in House elections 
and its implications for voter turnout.
INFORMATION IN HOUSE ELECTIONS
The cost of information in House elections is typically much higher than 
in senatorial or presidential elections. The greater media coverage and can-
didate advertising found in elections for higher office attest to this differ-
ential. Numerous studies at the individual level consistently demonstrate 
that voters are ill-informed about House elections (for example, see Mann 
and Wolfinger 1980; Stokes and Miller 1962). However, when individu-
als are able to identify candidates, incumbents are much better known 
(Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Zaller 1992). While recall of candidates’ names 
is generally low, incumbents are more than twice as likely to be correct-
ly named (Jacobson 1992: 118). The general inability to name the challeng-
er, the more dynamic ingredient of competitive House elections, suggests 
that voters often have little knowledge of the election in which they are 
participating.
Why do voters have so little knowledge about House challengers? In 
deciding whom to vote for in a House election, Aldrich (1993) notes that 
when the challenger is unknown, voters
appear to construct decision rules about whom to support from [an] 
asymmetric informational base. ... Since the incumbent has an unusu-
ally high degree of control over this readily obtainable information 
in House elections, it should be no surprise that the rationally ill-in-
formed voter typically decides that the incumbent is doing at least an 
adequate job. (Aldrich 1993: 262, f.18)
Aldrich’s conception of voting in House elections is further elaborated 
by the logic of McCubbins and Schwartz’s (1984) theory of “fire alarms” 
and “police patrols.” Voters, like members of Congress in their oversight 
of the bureaucracy, may prefer fire alarms—being informed by others of 
a problem—to a police patrol system that involves active monitoring. In 
elections, challengers subsidize information costs (e.g., attempt to con-
vince voters with negative information about the incumbent). Thus, absent 
a well-funded, high quality candidate to convince voters that the incum-
bent is shirking her responsibility, voters rationally choose the status quo.
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PRIOR BELIEFS AND VOTER TURNOUT
The implications of low information contests, such as House elections, 
are not examined in empirical tests of rational actor models of voter turn-
out (Aldrich 1993: 262). Futhermore, these empirical tests have “been 
hampered by an overly narrow interpretation of the theoretical models” 
(Aldrich 1993: 274). The calculus of voting model implicitly assumes that 
each election is an isolated event and that decisions to vote are made sole-
ly on estimates of the current election. In the Riker and Ordeshook model 
(1968: 28), the decision to vote is represented by the following equation:
R = PB - C + D,
where R is the reward that an individual receives for voting; P is the prob-
ability that, by voting, an individual will bring about the benefit of having 
his preferred candidate elected; B is the difference in benefits an individual 
receives from the success of his preferred candidate over his less preferred 
one; C is the cost of voting; and D is a sense of citizen duty (or the non-in-
strumental effects of voting such as efficacy).
Based on empirical findings at the individual level, we relax the assump-
tion that voters have information about challengers. Although Aldrich’s 
discussion of asymmetric voting choice is a plausible explanation for how 
voters use information shortcuts in calculating B, it cannot explain how 
voters calculate the P term. If a rational voter does not have information 
about the challenger, or does not even know if a challenger is running, it is 
likely that she cannot calculate B. Holding C and D constant, if we assume 
that voters have no information about the challenger (are unable to calcu-
late B), it is unlikely that they will be able to calculate P.
In low information elections where knowledge of B is absent, we as-
sume that P is primarily derived from prior beliefs regarding the close-
ness of elections.1 In the absence of fire alarms, therefore, we propose that 
P is derived from Pt-1, prior beliefs about closeness. Although prior beliefs 
about the closeness of elections does not solve the empirical problem that 
P is essentially zero, they provide a solution to how voters estimate P in 
information-poor environments, such as House elections.
Prior beliefs extend the basic Riker and Ordeshook (1968) model to give 
potential voters expectations about the competitiveness of their congres-
sional district. The inclusion of prior beliefs places voters within a larger 
context or game in which they must decide whether to vote based on N 
1While prior beliefs are based on strategic behavior as found in game theory, they 
are nonetheless expectations and not an actual game. Thus, their inclusion is ap-
propriate to the calculus of voting which is decision theoretic.
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previous elections. These expectations are based on past strategic behav-
ior (what voters did in prior elections) and are updated by new informa-
tion (the closeness of the current election). According to Morrow (1994: 
162), “When actors are uncertain, they use new information to update 
their beliefs about underlying states of the world. Rarely is new informa-
tion decisive for judging the state of the world. Instead, it shifts the play-
er’s judgment about the likelihood of different states.” Although voters 
have prior beliefs about all elections—not just those in which information 
is scarce—the relative importance of prior beliefs should be greater when 
new information is scarce.2 Absent new information, in elections in which 
information is not abundant, voters should decide whether to vote based 
on prior information about the closeness of elections in their congressio-
nal district. 
Moreover, prior beliefs about the competitiveness of elections parallels 
the vast literature on retrospective voting. This theory of rational voting is 
contingent on voters using past information about the incumbent’s perfor-
mance to determine their vote in the current election (Downs 1957; Fiori-
na 1981; Kramer 1971). In determining the candidate differential, Downs 
(1957) asserts that this information is based, in part, on evaluations of the 
party in power. Building on Downs, Fiorina (1981) finds that information 
about the performance of the incumbent party affects voter behavior in 
the current election. For example, poor economic conditions at time t will 
have the effect of reducing support for an incumbent (or the party of the 
incumbent) at time t + 1. According to Fiorina (1981: 12), the simple but 
powerful logic behind retrospective voting is that “knowledge of past per-
formance is cheaper to acquire (it is acquired automatically, in effect) than 
knowledge of future plans.”
Although Downs and Fiorina are concerned with the effect of past pol-
icies in determining vote choices, the logic of the argument is consis-
tent with the decision to vote. In order to reduce the high costs asso-
ciated with voting in low information campaigns, voters use prior be-
liefs about the state of the world-the competitiveness of their congressio-
nal district-to calculate expected closeness. In districts with a history of 
close elections, potential voters should be more likely to cast their ballot 
than potential voters in those districts with a history of lopsided election 
outcomes. Ceteris paribus, those in competitive districts are more like-
ly to vote because they believe that the upcoming election will be close. 
Thus, information about past elections should influence individuals’
2The acquisition of new information and its relative importance to updating be-
liefs about the state of the world is derived from Bayes’s Theorem. For a good dis-
cussion of Bayesian updating and prior beliefs see Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) and 
Morrow (1994, chap. 6).
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beliefs about the closeness of the current election, and consequently their 
decisions to vote. 
A TEST OF PRIOR AND UPDATED BELIEFS
In this section we present and evaluate the explanatory power of four 
measures of prior and updated beliefs about the closeness of elections. An 
obvious indicator of prior beliefs about the competitiveness of House elec-
tions is the absolute value of the margin of victory achieved by the win-
ning candidate in the prior election. We expect that if a candidate wins 
the previous election by a large margin, citizens are more likely to believe 
that the upcoming election will result in a lopsided victory for the incum-
bent. Because the probability of affecting the outcome in the current elec-
tion is perceived as very low, we expect a lower aggregate level of turn-
out. However, if the prior election was close, voters are more likely to be-
lieve that the incumbent is vulnerable in the current election. Thus, a prior 
close election should increase turnout in the current election.
A second measure of prior beliefs is the defeat of an incumbent in the 
prior election. Incumbents are rarely defeated (about 3 percent of the time), 
and when they are, we expect citizens to use this information in deciding 
whether to vote in the next election. As with the effects of prior closeness, 
the defeat of an incumbent in the prior election is likely to inform voters 
that either (1) the seat is unsafe and therefore likely to be hotly contested 
in the future or (2) the candidate is a first term member of Congress and 
likely to be in a competitive race. Consequently, citizens should be more 
likely to vote in the election following the defeat of an incumbent.
Although citizens use prior beliefs in their decisions to vote, these be-
liefs are updated when new information about the closeness of an election 
is available. In order to examine this question more directly, we use indi-
cators that are consistent with the information available to citizens prior 
to the election. Although the ex post measure of closeness used in many 
studies-the actual margin of victory-is a proxy for the perceived closeness 
of elections (Barzel and Silberg 1973: Berch 1993; Cox and Munger 1989: 
Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Settle and Abrams 1976), it does not accu-
rately capture the information individuals use when updating their be-
liefs. So, unlike other studies that do not use a Bayesian framework, we 
use measures of information that are available to citizens prior to decid-
ing to vote.
In general, the use of ex post measures does not properly depict an ac-
tor’s decision-making environment. In studies of voter turnout the mea-
sure of actual closeness in an election is only available to voters after the 
election has occurred. In contrast, a strategic politician’s approach em-
phasizes information voters have available to them before they vote. By 
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employing ex ante factors, it is possible to predict turnout. Aside from 
the fact that an ex post measure does not capture the information citi-
zens had available to them at the time they decided whether to vote, it 
implicitly assumes that citizens have near-complete information prior 
to the decision of whether to vote. As Gartner (1993: 367) argues in his 
study of Carter’s decision to rescue hostages from Iran, ex post measures 
“over-estimate the certainty with which decision makers knew the out-
come of policy choices.” Therefore, to test properly our model of deci-
sion-making based on updated beliefs it is important to depict accurate-
ly the information available to actors at the time the decision is made. 
For these reasons, we use the strategic politicians framework to recon-
ceptualize the central concern of rational choice empirical models—the 
closeness of elections.
The cost of information and updating beliefs is contingent on the be-
havior of strategic politicians. Specifically, the quality of candidates 
and their campaigns are the type of information voters use when they 
update their beliefs about the competitiveness of an election. As men-
tioned, new information is costly in the information-poor environment 
of House elections, especially regarding challengers. Nonetheless, infor-
mation available to voters varies with the characteristics of each election 
(candidates and campaigns). Empirical studies have found that infor-
mation in House elections varies according to factors such as challeng-
er spending (Zaller 1992) and whether the contest is an open seat (Mann 
and Wolfinger 1980). Most often, candidate expenditures and candi-
date quality affect the competitiveness of an election Oacobson and Ker-
nell 1983; Jacobson 1990). Voters update their prior beliefs about close-
ness based on the actions of those candidates running for office and their 
campaign organizations.
Whether candidates subsidize the costs of information that voters use 
in deciding to vote, and for whom, is contingent on the type of candidate 
that chooses to run. In Jacobson and Kernell’s (1983) strategic politicians 
framework, the strategic decisions of quality challengers—those with pri-
or office holding experience—affect the dynamics of the election. Quality 
challengers change the incentives for incumbents, inducing them to wage 
harder-fought campaigns. Further, the presence of these challengers af-
fects the incentives of potential contributors to give to both candidates. In 
this way, high quality candidates subsidize the high costs of information 
through advertising and direct mobilization. Moreover, they induce in-
cumbents to do the same.
Although Jacobson and Kernell (1983) found that prior officeholding ex-
perience had a significant effect on electoral outcomes, we apply this ap-
proach to voter turnout. The higher the quality of the challenger, the great-
er the probability that the challenger will have the resources to inform and 
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mobilize supporters. Increasing levels of challenger quality should there-
fore be associated with higher turnout.
Elections with higher quality challengers are also characterized by higher 
campaign spending (Mann and Wolfinger 1980). Following Dawson and 
Zinser (1976), Cox and Munger (1989) and Patterson and Caldeira (1983), 
we also control for changes in the level of overall spending between the 
current and previous election in order to capture changes in elite activi-
ty. Increases in campaign spending should be associated with relatively 
higher levels of turnout.
To evaluate the effects of prior and updated beliefs on turnout, we 
control for turnout in the prior election of like-type (e.g., midtermt-1 pre-
dicting midtermt). The inclusion of a lagged turnout variable provides 
a baseline to evaluate the effect of our measures of prior beliefs on turn-
out in the current election. This measure also controls for demograph-
ic and institutional variables that affect turnout levels across districts 
(Berch 1993).
For controls, we include variables indicating the presence of cotermi-
nous senatorial and presidential elections to take into account the effects 
of these races. We also control for those congressional races which are 
for open seats because these elections have a greater percentage of better 
known candidates, and therefore would be expected to have higher lev-
els of turnout.
Analysis
Given the above discussion, we evaluate the following four hypotheses:
H1: The closer the win-loss margin of the prior election, the higher the 
level of turnout in the current election.
H2: The defeat of an incumbent in the prior election will increase turn-
out in the current election.
H3: The greater the (positive) difference in the quality of the challeng-
er between the current and prior elections, the higher the level of turn-
out in the current election.
H4: The greater the (positive) difference in the amount of spending 
of challengers between the current and prior elections, the higher the 
level of turn-out in the current election.
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following OLS regression equa-
tion:
TURNOUT = b0 + b1MARGINt-1 + b2INC DEFEATt-1 + b3 ΔQUALITY + b4
ΔSPENDING + b5TURNOUTt-2 + b6SENATE + b7PRESIDENT + b8OPEN + e
where TURNOUT is the total number of votes cast in the 1986 and 1988 
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Congressional elections divided by the age-eligible population;3 MAR-
GINt-1, is the margin of victory in the prior election.4 INC DEFEATt-1, is 
coded as one (1) if the incumbent in the prior election was defeated and 
zero (0) if not; ΔQUALITY is the difference between the quality of the chal-
lenger in the current election and the quality of the challenger in the pre-
vious election. The quality of candidates is coded zero (0) if the candidate 
has not held prior elective office, one (1) if the candidate has held prior 
political office;5 ΔSPENDING is operationalized as the percentage differ-
ence in spending between the current and prior elections;6 TURNOUTt-2 is 
TURNOUT lagged two elections; SENATE is a dummy variable coded as 
one (1) if there was a Senate race and zero (0) if there was not; PRESIDENT 
is a dummy variable, coded as one (1) if there was a presidential election 
that year and zero (0) if it was a midterm election; OPEN is a dummy vari-
able with one (1) representing an open seat and zero (0) indicating that the 
contest has an incumbent; and e represents the error term.
To be included, elections had to have a minimum of two candidates 
(e.g., we exclude unopposed elections) who spent at least $5,000 each. The 
resulting data set has 477 observations for the 1986 and 1988 congressio-
nal elections. Table 1 displays the estimates of our model.
The results of the regression analysis are consistent with our expecta-
tions. The model accounts for 88 percent of the variation in turnout rates 
and is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. The two indicators of 
prior electoral competitiveness, MARGINt-1 and INC DEFEATt-1, are sig-
nificant and in the predicted direction. The  coefficient for the lagged in-
cumbent defeat variable, INC DEFEAT, is 0.015 (p < 0.05) suggesting that, 
on average, a defeat of an incumbent in the prior election increases turn-
out in the current election by 1.5 percent. The coefficient for the closeness 
of the prior election, MARGINt-1, is also significant (p < 0.01) and in the 
predicted direction.7 Substantively, the coefficient of -0.05 implies that, on 
average, a one percent decline in the margin of victory in the preceding 
3Turnout figures were provided by the International Consortium for Political and 
Social Research, University of Michigan. Age-eligible population figures are based 
on U.S. Census Bureau data, following an estimation procedure used by Powell 
(1986) and Jackman (1987).
4We use the following equation to estimate MARGINt-1:
| 0.5 - (votesA/(votesA+votesB))|,
where A and B represent the candidates who received the highest number of votes 
in the election.
5We thank Gary Jacobson for providing this information.
6Data on overall levels of spending are from Federal Election Commission esti-
mates.
7Because we subtract the actual percentage difference from 0.5 (which represents 
the closest possible election), the lower the value, the closer the election.
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election (timet-1) increases turnout by about 0.5 percent in the current elec-
tion (timet).
As expected, turnout in the prior election of like type, TURNOUTt-2, is 
a strong predictor of turnout in the current election. The sign of the coef-
ficient is positive and significant well beyond the p < 0.01 level. The large 
size of the coefficient suggests that turnout in congressional districts is
Table 1
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Prior and Updated Beliefs on Turnout 
in the 1986 and 1988 House Elections
 Variable   Coefficient  T-ratio
 MARGINt-1   -0.054     2.74**
 INC DEFEAT    0.015     1.67*
 ΔQUALITY    0.003     0.90
 ΔSPENDING    0.003     2.59**
 TURNOUTt-2    0.895   38.28**
 SENATE    0.016     4.02**
 PRESIDENT    0.032     7.42**
 OPEN -     0.006     0.98
 INTERCEPT   -0.009     0.77
R2 = 0.88    F = 425**    N = 477
*significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed test); **significant at the 0.01 level (one-
tailed test).
rather stable across elections. The two control variables of electoral con-
text, a coterminous senatorial or presidential election, have a positive ef-
fect on turnout levels. The variable SENATE has a coefficient of 0.016 (p < 
0.01) which suggests that the presence of a Senate election increases turn-
out levels 1.6 percent. Likewise, the variable PRESIDENT is highly signif-
icant (p < 0.01) and in the predicted direction. The coefficient (0.032) sug-
gests that, on average, the presence of a presidential election increases 
turnout by approximately 3.2 percent. Surprisingly, the control for open 
seats is not distinguishable from zero (p < 0.324).
The results of the strategic politicians variables are mixed. Although the 
coefficient for ΔQUALITY is in the predicted direction, it is not statistical-
ly significant. On the other hand, differences in spending between the cur-
rent and the prior election have a positive, significant effect on turnout.8 
This result supports Cox and Munger’s (1989) finding that total spending 
is highly related to turnout.
8One possible explanation for these mixed results is that increases in the quality of 
candidates are associated with increases in overall spending. However, the corre-
lation between these two variables is only 0.15.
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The cross-sectionally dominant nature of our pooled design is a poten-
tial concern about the robustness of our results. However, regression di-
agnostics for heteroscedasticity9 and influential outliers10 suggest that the 
results are robust.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that citizens use prior beliefs regarding the closeness 
of elections when deciding whether to vote. In reasoning under uncertain-
ty, especially in information-poor environments such as House elections, 
voters rely heavily on information regarding their district’s prior elector-
al competitiveness to assess its general level of competitiveness. This in-
formation, in turn, forms voters’ prior beliefs about the expected utility of 
voting successive elections. If presented with low cost information, voters 
update their beliefs about the closeness of an election.
The robust nature of our measures, controlling for other explanations, 
suggests that voters in low information elections use prior beliefs when 
making decisions about whether to vote. Both of our indicators of pri-
or beliefs, the effect of prior closeness and the defeat of an incumbent in 
the last election, indicate that voters use prior beliefs about the competi-
tiveness of elections. Not surprisingly, we also found that voters update 
their beliefs about the closeness of elections through higher turnout lev-
els when candidate spending is high. Thus, voters form prior beliefs about 
9An examination of the residuals plotted against the fitted values indicate a ho-
moscedastic distribution. As a second test of heteroscedasticity, we regressed the 
absolute values of the residuals on all independent variables. Three variables had 
significant coefficient estimates (P < 0.05 using a two-tailed test): turnout in the 
prior election, the presence of a presidential election, and the presence of a senate 
election. These estimates indicate that the magnitude of the residuals for the mod-
el as a whole varies systematically by the values of these variables, independent of 
the effects of the other variables in the model. The standard errors for these vari-
ables will be inflated, and therefore the t-ratios will be negatively biased. To as-
sess the possible biasing effects of heteroscedasticity on the results presented in 
Table 1, we reestimated the model using median regression (Narula and Welling-
ton 1982). The estimates from this procedure were virtually identical to those ob-
tained using ordinary least squares.
10A second concern is the effect of outliers on the estimates presented in Table 1. 
We identified three possible influential points. To assess the effect they had on the 
estimates obtained above, we ran separate regressions controlling for these cases 
singly and jointly. The estimates we obtained were substantively very similar to 
those presented in Table 1. As an additional check, we reestimated the model us-
ing robust regression, which takes into account the effect of each observation of 
the overall results (see Berk 1990). Once again, the estimates were very similar to 
those from the ordinary least squares regression.
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the competitiveness of their congressional district and update these beliefs 
when new information is readily available.
However, further research on voters prior beliefs about the closeness of 
elections and the decision to vote is needed at the individual level. Since 
our research is based on aggregate-level data, our findings are only sug-
gestive of individual-level behavior. A study similar to that of Blais et al. 
(1995) in which competing hypotheses are tested jointly would be useful 
for this purpose.
An area we hope to explore in later research is the possible objection 
that the relationship between our measures of prior beliefs about elector-
al competitiveness and voter behavior are mediated. Although we con-
trol for the effects of strategic politicians, local media may be responsi-
ble for informing voters of past electoral outcomes. For example, Iyengar 
and Kinder (1987: 104) report “a huge and politically consequential prim-
ing effect” on candidate feeling thermometers when television emphasiz-
es positive candidate qualities. Similar effects might be found if local me-
dia emphasize the vulnerability of a candidate following an election in 
which an incumbent has been defeated or won by a small margin.
In contrast to approaches that use an ex post measure of closeness, we 
provide more reasonable measures to account for information voters use 
to make decisions. Our research design avoids the possible bias in ex post 
measures of closeness and therefore advances empirical studies of vot-
er voter turnout by focusing on the closeness of elections in a predictive 
manner. By modeling voters’ prior beliefs and the behavior of strategic 
politicians, this design provides a richer notion of the decision to vote in 
the lower-information environment that characterizes House elections.
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